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T he increased turmoil in international
financial markets, starting with the Asian
crises of 1997, has led to calls for finan-
cial assistance from the wealthier nations.
In December 1997, the United States an-
nounced a $5 billion commitment toward
an international package of financial as-
sistance for South Korea. Two months
earlier the United States pledged $3 bil-
lion for assistance to Indonesia. In both
instances, the Exchange Stabilization
Fund (ESF) was to be involved.
Established by Congress in 1934 to help
stabilize the international value of the
dollar, the ESF received little public
attention until it was used in the provi-
sion of financial assistance to Mexico in
the wake of the peso crisis of 1995.
Indeed, greater scrutiny may have been
inevitable given the ESF’s expansion
beyond its original mandate.1 Despite the
recent attention, the full range of ESF
activities and the actual amount of avail-
able ESF resources are not well under-
stood. This impedes an informed public
discussion of ESF operations. 
Amajor goal of this Economic Commen-
tary is to facilitate accurate assessments
of the amount of resources available to
the ESF. First, in order to understand the
uses of ESF resources, we provide an
overview of ESF operations. Second, we
examine the ESF balance sheet to show
how “total assets” is a poor measure of
the resources available to the ESF for one
of its major activities, foreign-exchange
intervention. Third, we discuss how any
measure of ESF resources must take
account of warehousing and swap lines.
Finally, we suggest a better procedure for
assessing the amount of resources avail-
able to the ESF. 
 An Overview of the ESF
The ESF began operations on April 27,
1934, with capital of $2 billion. Initially,
$1.8 billion of the ESF’s reserves were
maintained in the Treasury’s gold
account. The remaining $200 million
was deposited in a special account at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York as
the working balance for investing in
gold and foreign exchange.2 The work-
ing fund of the ESF has expanded over
time, reaching as high as $42 billion in
mid-1995.3 As documented by Schwartz
(1997), most of the growth in ESF assets
has occurred since 1960 and has com-
prised increases in foreign exchange and
securities. As of June 30, 1998, almost
60 percent of the asset total had been
financed by cumulative net income,
mainly reflecting interest earnings and
capital gains on foreign currencies.
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 excluded
the ESF from the congressional appro-
priations process and explicitly autho-
rized it to operate without congressional
oversight and accountability. In other
words, Congress gave exclusive control
of the ESF to the executive branch. All
decisions regarding the ESF are made by
the Secretary of the Treasury, subject to
the approval of the President.
Legislative changes in the late 1970s re-
duced somewhat the secrecy under which
the ESF operates and made it more ac-
countable to the Congress. For instance,
since 1979 the administrative expenses of
the ESF have been subject to the budget
process. Moreover, a 1977 amendment to
Section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act pro-
vides that:
“… a loan or credit to a foreign entity or
government of a foreign country may be
made for more than 6 months in a 12-
month period only if the President gives
Congress a written statement that unique
or emergency circumstances require the
loan or credit be for more than 6 months
(31 U.S.C. 5302(b)).”
Finally, 1978 legislation requires the
Treasury to provide monthly statements
of ESF activities to the House and Sen-
ate Banking Committees. Nevertheless,
none of these legislative changes has
reduced the discretion of the Treasury
Secretary in operating the ESF. All of his
decisions are final and not subject to
approval by the Congress.
 The Size of the ESF
Acommon misperception about the ESF
is that its size is adequately measured by
the “total assets” number reported on the
ESF balance sheet, published quarterly in
December 1999
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might seem to be a reasonable presump-
tion since the ESF cannot unilaterally
issue debt in financial markets. However,
several important aspects of ESF opera-
tions are not apparent from its balance
sheet. In particular, since many ESF
operations use dollar assets, any limita-
tion on the conversion of nondollar assets
to dollar assets is relevant to an assess-
ment of available ESF resources.
Intervention, the purchase or sale of for-
eign currencies to influence the interna-
tional value of the dollar, is a major use
of ESF resources (see box, opposite).
The other is the provision of financial
assistance to foreign countries. When-
ever the ESF sells foreign currency, it
produces a crediting of the ESF’s (non-
marketable) U.S. government security
account with the Treasury, which is
equivalent to “dollar” cash assets. When
purchasing foreign currency, the ESF
first obtains dollar balances—possibly
by selling some of its Treasury securities
to the Treasury (with the Federal Reserve
[hereafter, the Fed] acting as agent). The
subsequent purchase of foreign exchange
with dollars leaves the ESF with a lower
level of Treasury securities but an off-
setting increase in “foreign exchange 
and securities.”
Thus the relevant measure of resources
available for ESF interventions depends
on whether foreign exchange is being
bought or sold. Dollar assets are needed
to buy foreign-currency-denominated
assets. On the other hand, purchases of
dollars are financed from international
reserves, which include official holdings
of gold, foreign government securities or
deposits at foreign central banks, the
reserve position in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and special
drawing rights (SDRs).5
ESF accounting for SDRs provides
another example of why total assets is a
poor measure of available resources. The
SDR is an international reserve asset cre-
ated by the IMF (under the First Amend-
ment to its Articles of Agreement) to
supplement existing reserve assets. The
value of an SDR is determined by refer-
ence to a basket of currencies of the five
largest industrial-economy member
countries of the IMF. Pursuant to the
Special Drawing Rights Act of 1968,
SDRs allocated to the United States or
otherwise acquired by the United States
are resources of the ESF.
There are three SDR entries on the ESF
balance sheet (see table 1). The SDR
asset entry and the SDR liability entry,
“SDR allocations,” pertain to ESF link-
ages to the IMF. The allocations repre-
sent the current value of the provisions of
SDRs by the IMF to the U.S. Treasury,
which were transferred to the account of
the ESF.6 The SDR asset entry reflects
the dollar value of SDR allocations to the
United States plus interest earnings, valu-
ation changes, and sales and acquisitions
of SDRs from other IMF participants.
The third entry, “SDR certificates,”
equals the portion of the SDR assets
which has already been “used.” As noted
earlier, all SDRs owned by the U.S. gov-
ernment must be held by the ESF. In
other words, the ESF cannot engage in
transactions with either the U.S. Trea-
sury or the Fed that would result in a
reduction in the ESF’s SDR holdings.
Thus, in order to convert SDRs to dollar-
denominated assets, the ESF issues a
claim on its SDR assets to the Fed—
SDR certificates—in a process called
monetization.7 While this does not
decrease the SDR asset entry on the bal-
ance sheet of the ESF, it does increase
the certificate number by the amount of
the monetization. By law, the certificate
entry cannot exceed the SDR asset entry.
However, up to the limit imposed by the
SDR asset total, monetization increases
the size of the balance sheet, since the
certificate amount increases dollar for
dollar with the eventual purchase of
assets (for example, foreign-currency-
denominated government securities).8
Since the monetization process increases
the total asset number while decreasing
the amount of SDRs available to be
monetized, the certificate total must be
subtracted from total assets to arrive at
an estimate of the ESF’s available re-
sources. Thus, although total assets of
the ESF on June 30, 1998, were $39.7
billion dollars, a slightly more accurate
measure of available dollars would be
$30.4 billion. This is the sum of the non-
monetized portion of the SDR total 
($10 billion SDRs minus $9.2 billion
SDR certificates), the entry for U.S.
government securities with the Treasury
($15.7 billion), and the dollar value of
the German mark and Japanese yen
items ($13.9 billion). 
 Off-Balance-Sheet Financing
Congress limited the ability of the ESF
to issue liabilities on its own and thus,
perhaps intentionally, limited the ESF 
to financing new interventions through
the sale of assets, a practice known as
asset management. However, beyond
the uses of SDRs and securities as de-
scribed above the ESF can obtain addi-
tional dollar resources by moving for-
eign-denominated assets off-balance
sheet through an arrangement with the
Federal Reserve System. Thus, the
$30.4 billion on-balance sheet asset
number is still a flawed measure of the
dollar assets available to the ESF. 
The first problem is that, once the Treas-
ury securities (“dollars”) are exhausted,
the ESF cannot use its German mark as-
sets or Japanese yen assets to purchase
additional mark or yen items, respec-
tively, without first converting them into
dollar-denominated assets. This con-
version of the ESF’s foreign currency
portfolio into dollar-denominated assets
requires an off-balance-sheet financing
arrangement with the Fed, referred to 
as warehousing. 
TABLE 1 ESF BALANCE SHEET, JUNE 30, 1998
Assets ($ millions) Liabilities and capital ($ millions)
Held with U.S. Treasury: Current liabilities:
U.S. government securities 15,691 Accounts payable 223
Special drawing rights (SDRs) 10,001
Total current liabilities 223






Total other liabilities 15,724
Accounts receivable 119 Capital:
Capital account 200
Net income gain (+) or loss (–) 23,581
Total capital 23,781
Total Assets 39,727 Total liabilities and capital 39,727a
a. The column sum does not equal this number because of rounding error.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, December 1998, p. 108.Warehousing is a swap transaction in
which the Fed buys foreign exchange
from the ESF in a spot transaction and
sells it back with a forward transaction
—that is, the ESF agrees to exchange
dollar assets for foreign exchange on the
date the forward transaction comes due.
The ESF balance sheet would thus
record a decline in “foreign exchange
and securities” but an increase in the
“U.S. government securities” total,
which could be used to purchase foreign
currency or implement dollar loans to
foreign countries (the forward transac-
tion would not appear). In other words,
the Fed warehousing arrangement
allows the ESF to take a leveraged posi-
tion in foreign assets that is not reflected
on the ESF’s balance sheet.
Two factors complicate the ESF’s ability
to use the Fed warehouse. First, the size
of the warehouse is determined by
FOMC deliberations. Although the size
of the warehouse was increased to $20
billion to help finance the Mexican fi-
nancial assistance package in 1995, it is
currently limited to $5 billion with no
balances currently outstanding. Second,
although the currencies currently eligible
for the warehouse are indicated in the
Authorization for Foreign Currency
Operations, they are not necessarily the
same as the currencies that the ESF
needs to exchange.9
Since about 1978, warehousing has been
controversial. Goodfriend (1994) argues
currency-warehousing agreements
between the ESF and the Fed provide
the ESF with additional funding that cir-
cumvents the congressional appropria-
tions process and statutory limits on
Federal borrowing.10
The second problem with the on-balance-
sheet asset measure of ESF resources is
that it ignores swap lines. Swap lines,
formally called reciprocal currency
arrangements, are credit lines between
governments (or central banks) stipulat-
ing terms which, usually for a short
period of time, allow either country to
borrow the other’s currency.11 The
mechanics of drawing down a swap line
are similar to that of warehousing—off-
setting spot market and forward market
transactions—except that our swap lines
do not provide us with dollar assets
directly but rather provide dollar assets
for the other country. As in the ware-
housing arrangement, the forward mar-
ket transaction does not appear on the
balance sheet until the expiration of the
swap line.12  Drawings might be
renewed once routinely, but statutes
require that the executive branch report
subsequent renewals to Congress. Both
the Fed and the ESF maintain swap lines
the sizes of which are indicated in the
quarterly summary of ESF and Fed for-
eign exchange operations published in
the Federal Reserve Bulletin. As of
March 31, 1999, the only authorized
ESF swap line was with the Bank of
Mexico for $3 billion.13
Finally, any measure of ESF resources
available for intervention needs to take
account of any stated commitments by
the U.S. Treasury to provide financial
assistance to foreign governments via
the ESF. For instance, the commitments
that had been made to Korea and
Indonesia would have reduced the total
resources available for intervention as
reflected on the June 30 balance sheet 
by $8 billion.14
 Summary
The Exchange Stabilization Fund, under
the U.S. Treasury, is now routinely in-
volved in efforts to stabilize currencies
and to provide financial support to for-
eign countries. However, the amount of
resources available to the ESF and its
range of activities are perhaps not well
understood by many observers. In this
Economic Commentary we correct the
misperception that “total assets” is a good
measure of available ESF resources. 
First, “total assets” ignores the fact that
the monetization of SDRs does not
decrease the SDR asset entry even
though the total amount of monetization
is limited by the SDR asset number. Con-
sequently, total assets must be reduced by
the outstanding amount of monetization,
measured by the SDR certificate number.
Second, estimates of resources available
to the ESF for intervention must take into
account the warehousing arrangement
with the Fed. The current limit on the
size of the warehouse is relevant to
whether the foreign-currency-denomi-
nated assets could be converted into dol-
lars for use in purchasing foreign assets.
Third, outstanding swaps and any exist-
ing commitments of ESF funds should be
reflected in estimated ESF resources. An
understanding of these points is a prereq-
uisite to an informed debate regarding
any change in ESF funding.
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13. In the last quarter of 1998, Federal
Reserve System swap lines were reduced
from $32.4 billion to $5 billion ($2 billion
with the Bank of Canada and $3 billion with
the Bank of Mexico), and the ESF eliminated
its swap line with the German Bundesbank.
There are no outstanding swaps for either
agency. Reasons stated for the reductions
included history of disuse, formation of the
European Central Bank, and the existence of
other arrangements for monetary cooperation.
14. The commitments to Korea and Indone-
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of International Settlements’$7.5 billion dol-
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